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When I served at the U.S. Department of the Treasury, I spent much of my time
thinking about corruption, money laundering, drug trafficking, counterterrorism,
and sanctions. My job at Treasury was stimulating in a lot of ways, but it was also
an extraordinarily frustrating job. My frustration involved the substance of what
we were trying to do in the Treasury, particularly with respect to international
corruption. When I was in government, the frustration was most endemic with
respect to governments presided over extreme poverty. I often spent time thinking
about the government of Haiti in particular, because I was on a National Security
Council committee dealing with the American relationship with Haiti. There were
about eighteen different American agencies that all had a role to play in trying to
assist Haiti.
This was at a time when American goals in Haiti focused on building national
capacity. It was a challenge not unlike what we are facing now in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Every time the Treasury had a discussion about the situation with the
White House, it would quickly come back to one question: how to stop the people
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that we thought we could trust in Haiti from making money disappear from Haitian
bank accounts and reappear in Swiss bank accounts. Government officials came
up with regulatory strategies. The White House representative might make a list of
all the people he was going to call and reprimand in Haiti. But somehow, the
money kept disappearing.
When I joined the government I thought of corruption issues primarily as issues
involving economic development and business. By the time I finished this
experience working in government, it became very clear to me that there was a
more complex issue that was endemic and connected with corruption. In
particular, it had to do with the ability of the American government to make a
compelling political case for spending hundreds of millions of dollars around the
world, particularly with respect to Haiti. It became clear that if we did not find a
way of stopping money from disappearing in Haiti, we were going to be fighting a
constant uphill battle, and probably a battle we could not win, to persuade people
in Congress, people in civil society, and international non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) to continue pouring money into Haiti.
The international corruption problem is a major problem. It is a problem that
lawyers, people from the policy community, people in governments, and people
who try to undo the knot between corruption and atrocity do not know how to fix.
There are also a few larger issues that are illustrated by an anecdote about
corruption.
For several years, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone
conducted a campaign of utter atrocity. The RUF hacked people to death, chopped
people's hands off to intimidate them, and gouged people's eyes out. They
essentially acted as if they were trying to achieve hell on earth. It is so difficult to
read about what happened in Sierra Leone that when I first started doing research,
it was quite hard even to finish books and articles about the subject, and, in
particular, to read victim testimonies. People who had applied, for example, for
refugee status in Europe and the United States talked about how utterly atrocious it
could be to survive in the highlands of Sierra Leone, where diamond fields make it
possible for people to pick up chunks of stone and actually become rich in their
particular domain.
It was certainly not the case during the Cold War that one could expect quick
United Nations Security Council action on such matters. One cannot really expect
quick Security Council action now. But in a post-Cold War world there is at least
one thing that we can expect from the Security Council - if none of the permanent
members have a huge interest in what is going on and block a sanctions resolution
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of some kind, the Security Council is likely to seriously consider, and sometimes
pass, a resolution.
In this day and age, we have a very imperfect UN, but we do have the
beginnings of an international administrative law system. If the UN passes a
broad, vague resolution, experts go to work on it and put some more detail into it.
When the UN Security Council passed a resolution on the situation in Sierra
Leone, one of the resolution's' requirements was that diamonds obtained from
Sierra Leone could not have been trafficked as conflict diamonds. The Council did
not want these diamonds to find their way into the American and the European
markets or developed countries, where they would end up on engagement rings,
and have this market continue to fuel the conflict.
The UN developed an elaborate strategy to enforce this resolution.2 The UN
planned to give Sierra Leone money to establish a licensing system that would
include miners, workers who were working at the mines, middlemen, workers who
would buy and sell rough diamonds, the high council on diamonds headquartered
in Brussels, Belgium (that oversees the entire industry), and, finally, all the large
legitimate players in the diamond industry. The UN's goal was to ensure that as a
little chunk of earth with embedded rough diamond was mined out of the earth
somewhere in Sierra Leone, a chain of custody could be established to know who
had held on to that little piece. The chain would include what worker had given it
to what factory boss, what factory boss had sold it or given it to his boss, who from
the factory had then turned it over to a diamond broker and then what company the
diamond broker had given it to.
This UN resolution benefited the Sierra Leone government because it enabled
the government to charge duties on this plan and generate money. Unfortunately,
the Revolutionary United Front found that it could make deals with people in
Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone, and establish a price for a diamond. Once a
handshake had occurred over the price, the diamond would then turn up in the
capital of Guinea, which borders Sierra Leone.
The diamond might be smuggled out of Sierra Leone, possibly requiring a tiny
payment to be given to some Sierra Leone customs official who might be checking
passengers as they were getting on the ferry to go to Guinea. Or the diamond
might be smuggled simply by hiking across highlands and going directly into
Guinea. Once in Guinea, the RUF representative would sit down at a bar or
I. S.C. Res 1643, para. 6, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1643 (Dec. 15, 2005).
2. See http://www.worlddiamondcouncil.com (follow "Export/Import Control") (process is
called the "Kimberley Process").
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restaurant with a diamond broker, the diamond broker would inspect the
merchandise, and money would change hands. A small payment would then be
made to the customs authorities in Guinea, who would develop a completely
counterfeit and fake certificate of origin indicating the diamond had actually been
mined in Guinea, and the diamond would be sold to De Beers or some other
company where it would find its way out as an engagement ring.
A key aspect of this chain of custody is the fact that the RUF wanted to turn the
diamonds over very quickly and had, at one point or another in their history of
assorted conflict, control of most of the diamond fields that were important in
Sierra Leone. The RUF could actually sell the diamonds at an incredible discount,
eighty or ninety percent below what a legitimate diamond would cost. As a result,
it was amazingly quick and easy for the RUF officials to be able to sell diamonds.
The middlemen who bought conflict diamonds could then make an incredible
market compared to the market for legitimate diamonds.
If you compare the figures that the High Diamond Council in Belgium has on
the importation of diamonds into Europe from Guinea with the figures that the
Guinean government officially keeps, you will find an incredible disparity proving
the existence of these illegal activities. For example, in 1997 the Guinean
government reported that two million carats of diamonds were exported; however,
the High Diamond Council in Belgium indicated that four million carats were
received. So two million carats, each carat worth about eight or nine hundred
dollars, account for the disparity.
The smuggling of conflict diamonds continued despite the elaborate
administrative provisions that the UN included in its resolution. Although UN
resolutions may not be the solution to the problem of international corruption, such
resolutions are a tiny step in the right direction even if such a step is likely to leave
several huge gaps. One such gap exists not because of the UN but because an
elaborate system of bank secrecy exists around the world. This system is
extraordinarily lucrative. Despite the praise for bank secrecy, in regards to money
laundering controls and counter-terrorist financing, such secrecy effectively allows
people with minimal identification and evidence to open a bank account, to access
the account with numbered codes, and to move hundreds of millions of dollars
around the world.
The second gap is evident in advanced industrialized countries where there are
broad and elaborate political economies that provide resistance to more intense and
strict financial regulation. Without bank secrecy havens, countries like the United
States would have to find other ways to regulate their own banks.
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A third gap exists because the people who are responsible for fighting
international and domestic corruption are fragmented into different agencies and
have different responsibilities. UN prosecutors of one culture and investigators of
a different culture may be concerned with different things. For example, there are
agencies that have increasingly become concerned with only one aspect of this
criminal finance problem -counter-terrorist financing. As a result, gaps continue
to proliferate.
The fourth gap consists of jurisdictional problems that occur when countries
point fingers at each other with respect to whose responsibility it is to resolve a
problem.
A fifth gap left by the UN resolution exists because countries with strategic
goals, even in this post-Cold War world, might actually depend on allowing
extraordinarily corrupt regimes or rankings to proliferate.
Despite these problems, there is hope as seen in the beginnings of a new and
different political coalition that includes NGOs which are traditionally concerned
with human rights violations and atrocities. This coalition is increasingly
understanding that one dimension of this problem does not just include post-
conflict adjustments or transitions, but involves elaborate financial regulation. It is
possible that as this coalition of different players and governments evolves over
time, we will have a different measure of political will to do something about these
problems.
Jacqueline Hand, Panelist*
I am going to be talking about an example similar to Mr. Cuellar's. The Probo
Koala is a tanker ship which serves as a symbol for the unintended consequences
of globalization, and the reality that there is no functioning regulatory system to
manage globalization. This particular ship is multinational to an astounding
degree. The builder is Korean, the owner is Greek, the flag is a Panamanian, and
the charter was arranged by the London office of a Swiss company. This
company, called Trafigura, is one of the largest commodity traders in the world
with a turnover of forty-five billion dollars a year and equity of about a billion
Jacqueline Hand is a professor at University of Detroit Mercy School of Law. Professor
Hand joined the UDM faculty after practicing in a major corporate law firm in the areas of
banking, real estate and probate. As a professor, she has pursued her interest in
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society. She has published articles on Michigan's use of anti-nuisance statutes for farmland
preservation. She also co-authored Neighboring Landowners (McGraw-Hill, 1988).
Professor Hand is currently working on issues of international environmental law, and is
writing an article on environmental impact assessment in India, based upon research
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dollars.
Last summer, the ship Probo Koala arrived at the Port of Amsterdam. (Press
reports indicate that it appears to have come from the U.S., although the United
States does not seem to be implicated in the events which followed.) The ship has
two separate holds, one was a holding container for slop, which is the by-product
created by the cleaning of the second hold, which carried the payload of gasoline.
The ship had prearranged with the Amsterdam port authorities to have the slop
tank cleaned out for a payment of 15,000 euros. However, once the port
authorities saw both the volume and the content of the slop, the price for disposal
increased from 15,000 euros to 300,000 euros. True slops are made up of spent
caustics soda (which is used to clean the tank), some gasoline residues, and extra
water. The material in the hold of the Probo Koala included hydrogen sulfide and
a substance called mercaptides, a byproduct of hydrocarbons. Some experts have
speculated that this unexpected material is a result of illegally refining gasoline at
sea. (Hydrogen sulfide and mercaptides are expected by-products of gasoline
refining.)
When Probo Koala received the new price for cleaning out the slop tank, the
London office of the Swiss company rejected the 300,000 euro offer. Instead, the
ship reloaded the material and proceeded to Estonia to pick up a load of gasoline.
From there it traveled to Nigeria and unloaded the gasoline. Finally, Probo Koala
arrived in Abidjan in the Ivory Coast and arranged with a treatment company
called Tommy to offload the slops. Trafigura, the Swiss Company, says that
Tommy is properly certified to dispose of the wastes but it is quite clear when you
look at statements from the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) that
any company regularly dealing in this sort of materials knows that no processor
exists in the Ivory Coast that could possibly handle this material safely. Some
press reports suggest that Tommy is partially owned by Trafigura itself and/or by
the family of the president of the country.
Once the slops were offloaded, in the middle of the night a dozen trucks took
the waste to twenty different locations around Abidjan and dumped it. These
locations included places close to market gardens, as well as housing and prisons.
By morning, people began waking up, and finding that they had trouble breathing,
a condition accompanied by stinging eyes, bleeding noses, and aching stomachs.
Within the next four days, ten people had died, sixty-nine people were
hospitalized, and thousands more were treated. More people would probably have
been hospitalized if Ivory Coast's poverty did not severely limit the availability of
hospital beds.
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This tragic incident is a telling example of globalization run amok. On its
website, Trafigura continues to assert that the waste was just standard slops, not a
hazardous waste for which the cost of disposal was externalized to a poor and
vulnerable citizenry. This is a case of a corrupt and fraudulent decision, made with
the collaboration of at least some officials in Ivory Coast. The local Ivory Coast
population was sufficiently convinced of the collusion of the local officials that a
group of locals surrounded the limousine of the Energy Minister, pulled him out,
and took him over to one of these sites and made him breathe the material. Within
several days government fell, but as sometimes happens in parliamentary systems,
it was reconstituted a couple of days later without the Energy Minister.
This occurrence received quite a lot of press worldwide. My sources for this
summary of events include Der Stern, the Hindu Times, the New York Times, and
the BBC. 3 But this is only the most recent and the most visible example of the
industrialized nations externalizing the cost of disposing of the worst of their waste
in less developed nations. In Ivory Coast, the toxic material happened to have an
immediate effect. However, one of the real problems with toxic materials is they
can have a latency period of fifteen to twenty-five years before the symptoms of
the various illnesses begin to show up, making timely protection and remediation
particularly difficult.
In the period immediately following World War H, two independent structural
changes in society began which have come together to produce this and similar
incidents. First, massive industrialization fomented by the second war, created
what was essentially a second industrial revolution, one characterized by the
development of many potent new chemicals. This industrialization also included
the beginnings of a revolution in the production of electronics of all kinds. We are
just now beginning to realize the real challenge that dealing with electronic
discarded-waste, will provide The second is equally dramatic-the rise a
geometric growth of transnational corporations.
When the 16th and 17th centuries saw the formation of the nation state as the
dominant form of political organization in society, the system of international law
developed around these entities. Since the 1940's a new economic (and effectively
political) force has begun to dominate- the multinational corporation. The
transnational corporation has become a major addition to the system, in many
instances almost replacing smaller states. By 1990, the international system
contained 37,000 transnational corporations, and if you count companies with
3. See, e.g., Lydia Polgreen & Marlise Simons, Global Sludge Ends in Tragedy for Ivory
Coast, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2006, in "Health."
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foreign subsidiaries, there were 170,000. Of the fifty largest economies in the
world, roughly half are these large corporations. For example, General Motors,
which is currently struggling, remains one of the largest economies in the world.
These corporations wield massive power and often effectively operate beyond the
realm of any single national regulatory authority over all their operations.
For the first twenty years or so after World War II, many chemicals and their
by-products were created with very little regulation of their ultimate disposal.
After publicity triggered by incidents such as Probo Koala, the United States
passed a law that requires hazardous chemicals be tracked from generation to
disposal and established a complex and expensive standards for their safe
disposal.4 When the cost of legal disposal increased dramatically, many companies
began to ship this waste to the developing world. Similar regulations were
gradually adopted in most of the industrial nations of the northern hemisphere. In
one notorious example, the country of Guinea was offered $600 million to accept
whatever hazardous waste the arranger of the intermediary would bring to the
country. This amount was twice Guinea's Gross National Product (GNP) for a
single year. (The intermediary was going to make about $400 billion profit from
this deal.)
Once this approach to disposal became more generally known, the developing
world became increasingly angry at the practice. The United Nations
Environmental Program (UNEP) sponsored the development of a regime to
regulate the practice of exporting hazardous materials to the less developed
nations. The resulting Basel Convention 5 is probably the most comprehensive
regulatory scheme operative in international environmental law today.
This treaty is built around the concept of prior informed consent. For example,
a company which wishes to dispose of hazardous wastes in another country can
negotiate a contract with a disposal company in that country. It is then required to
inform its own government about the contract as well as a clear explanation of the
nature and quantity of the waste to be disposed of. The exporting country is then
required to send a letter to the government of the importing country, explaining the
details of the contract and asking for its consent. The system presupposes that if
the importing country is not technically competent to manage these wastes, it will
refuse to approve the arrangement. However, if the country does consent, the
4. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §6921 et seq. (1976)) (incorporated
within the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §6901, et seq. (2007)).
5. The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wasted
and their Disposal, 1992, available at http://www.basel.int/text/con-e-rev.pdf.
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materials enter the importing country regardless of technical competence to
manage the waste safely. There is generally little follow up on the actual ultimate
destination of the material.
Under the Basel Convention mechanism, if it turns out that the country is not
able to take reasonably appropriate measures to dispose of the materials, or if the
waste enters the country without the proper consent, then the materials are
supposed to be returned to the country of export. But nothing in the treaty
designates who pays for their return and proper disposal. The few times this
retrieval has been attempted have not been successful. After some experience with
the Basel Convention, regime leaders of the less developed world (and
international environmental NGOs) were not happy with the lack of protection
offered. After extensive lobbying, an amendment to the Basel Convention was
adopted and named the Basel Ban. The amendment banned all hazardous waste
exports from twenty-nine of the wealthiest and most industrial nations, including
all the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
countries except the US. (The US has not ratified the Basel Convention and
consequently is not a party.)6
The Basel Ban required sixty-two ratifications in order to go into effect. It now
has sixty-two, but it is still not clear whether the Ban has in fact gone into effect
because the same parties who made the ratifications were not the original
signatories. It is still a matter of legal argument within the international
community, but the Ban is generally assumed not to be in effect. The Basel
Convention has been opposed by the United States, Canada, and South Korea.
Although the United States is outside the Basel system officially, one of its
provisions states that a party cannot trade waste with anybody who is not a party
unless that party has comparable bilateral agreements. The United States does
have bilateral agreements with Canada and a number of other jurisdictions and so
can engage in much of the world trade in such waste.
Another effort to control the export of hazardous waste is the Bamako
Convention.7 The African states agreed that no hazardous waste should be
imported into the continent of Africa. The Ivory Coast has signed on to this
6. Ban Amendment to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Sept. 22, 1995, available at http://untreaty.un.org/
English/TreatyEvent2002/Texts/English/BaselConvAmend 16.pdf.
7. Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import Into Africa and the Control of Transboundary
Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes Within Africa, Jan. 20, 1991, available
at http://www.jus.uio.no/Im/hazardous.waste.ban.afican.import.bamako.convention. 1991 /
portrait.
5 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2(2007)
particular treaty, and any violation is considered illegal and criminal. Since nearly
every African country signed onto the Bamako Convention, it is definitely in
effect. In fact, however, its provisions are very ineffective because of the lack of
an international mechanism for enforcement. The convention instead encourages
individual member countries to pass their own civil and criminal laws for
violations of the Convention.
Efforts at controlling this transport of hazardous waste are rounded out by a
Basel Protocol on civil liability which is in the works, but is nowhere near getting
accepted. The Protocol has been on the table for about six years and it has only
received thirteen of the twenty signatures it needs to come into effect. Nobody
seems very anxious to sign on. Even if the Protocol does come into effect, none of
the provisions are realistically going to cause corporate decision makers, who stand
to make profits of 300,000 euros from these violations, to change their practices.
Thus, there is no obvious mechanism which, by way of criminal, and probably
civil, costs or consequences, would change the decision to remove the wastes from
Amsterdam where they could be disposed of safely but expensively, to Ivory Coast
where disposal is dangerous to the population, but cheap. To date, international
criminal liability only exists for defined war crimes, and, in general, enforcement
at the international level is haphazard at best. As a result the only option for
enforcement tends to be at the national level, where securing jurisdiction of the real
decision makers is highly unlikely. For example, Ivory Coast jailed seven people,
five of whom are locals and in low level positions such as guards at the port, as
well as two middle-level French managers from Trafigura. These two managers
had come from Nigeria to try to clamp down on the problem and have been in jail
ever since. (The company is currently trying to have them released.)
In Amsterdam, the port authorities who originally accepted the waste from the
Probo Koala and then let the ship leave the port are under investigation and
potentially could be charged within the Netherlands. The European Community
has called for an investigation, as has UNEP. The officials of the Port Authority
are at risk of prosecution, but it is unlikely that there is going to be any
consequences for the corporate officials who chose to put poor Africans at risk of
injury.
So at this point, if a corporation makes an economic decision that this sort of
corrupt violation is very much in their economic interests, there probably will be
few consequences since there are currently only limited effective mechanisms to
deter it. Further, the true multinational corporation is not within the control of any
particular nation state. In the case of the Probo Koala, it is hard to see which
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country the Ivory Coast could effectively sue for compensation under international
law.
The paradigmatic international environmental law case was decided in the
1920s. In this case, a copper smelter was spewing emissions into Idaho, and
possibly Montana, ruining farmers' crops. The U.S. protested to the Canadian
government and the matter was ultimately referred to an Arbitration Panel.8 The
panel concluded that the farmers received compensation for the loss of their crops
and livestock from the Canadian government. Then, the Canadian government
presumably collected the damages from the corporation which was acting within
its jurisdiction.
This contrasts with the harm caused by the Probo Koala where no one country
can be held responsible for Trafigura's actions. It is hard to imagine how a
solution to this problem could occur where there are so many national entities
involved. The only way that there is going to be an effective system to control
this, is if a system can be devised to deter the actual generators or the transporters
who potentially profit from unsafe, but cheap disposal methods. One possibility is
to look to the system that was created with the United States Superfund law. 9
Under CERCLA, the generator, transporter and disposer of hazardous waste are all
strictly liable for the proper disposal, liability enforced by the domestic court
system. To be effective any system must have an effective system of enforcement.
One model which might be followed is that of the World Trade Organization
(WTO). Failure to comply with its dictates is met with economic sanctions, an
enforcement mechanism that at least in theory could be applied directly against
offending corporations without separate national involvement. Thus, once
Trafigura, and/or the shipping company which owns the ship itself, are found to be
strictly liable, by some sort of arbitration system, the resulting agreement is that a
transporter in violation would be refused entry to ports overall for a set time
period. There are many problems with this idea, both theoretical and practical, but
as a starting point of discussion it does have the virtue of focusing on the real
problem of regulating the actions of transnational corporation themselves, rather
than on the nations which are able to exert limited control.
In conclusion, the tragedy of the Probo Koala is symptomatic of problems
which arise from the intersection of changes in the scale and nature of
industrialization and increasing globalization of economic transactions. It is
8. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Canada), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1938 & 1941).
9. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 1980 (42
U.S.C. § 9601 et seq).
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exacerbated by an international legal regime developed to facilitate relations
between nations which are ill equipped to control powerful multinational
corporations driven by the single-minded pursuit of profit.
Afterword provided by Professor Hand
Approximately two weeks after this live Symposium, Trafigura agreed to pay
$197 million (US) to compensate Ivory Coast for the Probo Koala disaster, despite
continuing to deny liability. As part of the settlement, Trafigura employees
imprisoned by the African country were released from prison. A spokesman for
the Ivory Coast has indicated that the money will be used to construct a new waste
disposal plant and a new hospital in Abijan.' 0 The settlement does not include the
individual victims and a private law suit is being brought in British courts by a
London law firm." The Dutch have also agreed to contribute 1 million Euros for
the clean up operation in the Ivory Coast. 12 The settlement has been criticized by
Greenpeace because it believes that as a result the Ivory Coast can be expected to
provide little assistance to securing compensation for individual victims. Thus, the
situation is somewhat better than predicted by my presentation but still
problematic.
Bill Black, Panelist and Moderator*
My name is Bill Black, and I am the executive director of the Institute for Fraud
Prevention. I teach economics and law, but I am actually a criminologist, and I
have just returned from a World Bank anticorruption mission abroad. I too have
been in the government. A criminologist would look at some of the issues that
have been brought up by Mr. Cuellar and Ms. Hand somewhat differently. What
have been discussed so far are aspects of failed states that impact other states,
mostly in the United States in terms of risks of terrorism. But failed states create
10. 30 BNA Int'l Env't Reporter 4 (2007)
11. Id.
12. Two Arrests in Probo Koala Scandal, DUTCH NEWS.NL, Feb 16, 2007, available at
http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2007/02/two arrestsin-probo..koala sca.php._
Dr. William Black is the Executive Director of the Institute for Fraud Prevention (IFP).
IFP's mission is to fund and conduct research and provide expert advice to help develop
best practices to fight fraud and corruption. Professor Black has taught at the LBJ School of
Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, as a Regents' Lecturer at the University
of California at Irvine, and as a distinguished scholar in residence at Claremont McKenna.
He received his A.B. in economics and a J.D. from the University of Michigan and a Ph. D.
in Criminology, Law and Society from the University of California at Irvine. He has an
international reputation in the fields of anti-fraud, anti-corruption, corporate governance and
effective and ethical regulatory leadership. He has recently authored The Best Way to Rob a
Bank is to Own One, which describes the concept of "control fraud," by which a CEO or
heads of state use the resources and power of the corporation or nation to defraud
customers, creditors, investors and citizens.
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risks in a whole host of dimensions.
In criminology jargon, one thing failed states do is create systems capacity
problems, which is characteristic of severe, endemic corruption. Many of these
capacity problems are deliberately generated, because the way to optimize
corruption is to destroy internal controls, and that produces this inevitable result.
The Kimberly Process 3 is a somewhat voluntary process involving the United
Nations and a host of signatories. Under this process, the UN and member states
work together with NGOs such as Amnesty International and diamond companies
to try to create a system to prevent conflict or blood diamonds from being
marketed in order to reduce support for these insurrections that involve such
incredible brutalities.
The African continental war is a war that most Americans do not even know
occurred. At the war's peak, there were nine nations fighting in Africa with armed
forces in the field and in the government, which was at the time either Zaire or
Congo. This continental war was related to a number of other conflicts, in
particular, the Rwandan genocide. But it was one of many unfortunate conflicts
that were going on at the time, many of which involved diamonds. Angola, along
with the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), was
financing many of the war activities, getting money from the United States through
sale of diamonds. Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Ivory Coast were also all involved in
the conflict diamond trade in one way or another. In criminology there is a
concept called control fraud, which applies when someone controls an organization
or a nation and uses that control as a weapon to defraud others, which can result in
massive losses. Enron is a classic example. If the CEO is the person who is
running the fraud, then that person can optimize the firm for fraud, which can
cause losses that dwarf, for example, all other property losses in the United States
for an entire year.
In the context of government, the same thing can happen. In government, it is
the head of state instead of the CEO that is involved, and we often call this a
kleptocracy. A head of state involved in control fraud is essentially looting from
the government. These heads of state are the financial super-predators of the
world. They cause enormous losses, which go well beyond financial losses,
because in the process, such losses typically ruin the country.
Frequently you see both the public and private sectors controlling fraud and
working together - crony capitalism is the most classic example. This is certainly
13. Kimberley Process, supra note 2.
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the case in the Congo and Zaire. And that is why white collar criminologists have
long pointed out that white collar crimes kill more people than blue collar crimes
do. And indeed, in this context, you get what is known in economics as
Aggressions Law mechanism. Aggressions Law is a metaphor, which actually
states that bad money drives good money out of circulation in hyperinflation. In
hyperinflation, the local currency is constantly losing value so you rush to the store
and you spend it that minute if you can, and you hoard the gold or the dollar or the
euros because that is gaining in value. So soon the only thing in circulation is all
the bad money.
Similarly, if you gain a competitive advantage by cheating, by disposing of the
waste improperly, then unless there is some form of effective enforcement, the bad
practices will drive good practices out of the marketplace. Bad practices will create
a profit opportunity. Unsafe products and work sites are typical examples. People
get killed by the environment. But people also get killed by counterfeit medicines,
by fake booze, by infant formula that has no active ingredients.
The kleptocrats have the ultimate in perverse incentives, because the way you
optimize a country for looting it is to do essentially everything wrong you can
imagine to the country. So if you want to extort money, you make sure that
everything has to come through you, because then you can extort money from
everyone that needs the necessary permissions. The kleptocrats also tend to be
very unpopular, and they have to stay in power. There are some well known
techniques for staying in power when you are looting the place. One is to suppress
rights - left, right and center; but there are other techniques. For example,
emphasize your family ethnic loyalties, align yourself with a hated minority, utilize
the traders in a number of countries that are ethnically different, repeat the colonial
practices of divide and conquer, and, of course, have the handy "the other" to
blame at all times.
In the context of Zaire, or Congo, Mobutu was a kleptocrat's kleptocrat. A
nation that should be extraordinarily rich because of its minerals was looted into
poverty. One author refers to him as King Leopold's ghost, Leopold being
notoriously rapacious. He actually owned the Congo personally as opposed to
Belgium owning the Congo. He was the strongest kleptocrat because of the Cold
War embrace of the autocrats. Jeanne Kirkpatrick and others theorized that
autocrats could change and be used to stop Communists in the meantime. 14
The thing that pushes Congo over the edge is the Rwandan genocide, because
14. See Jeanne Kirkpatrick, DICTATORSHIP AND DOUBLE STANDARDS: RATIONALISM AND
REALISM IN POLITICS (1982).
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remarkably the Tutsis end up wining. They reinvade the country, in essence, and
many of the Hutus flee. The guesstimates are that roughly two million Hutus flee.
So the Hutus commit genocide against the Tutsis, and some Hutus as well, and
these camps are largely set up for the refugees in what is at that time Zaire. Those
camps come to become controlled by the Hutu extremists, and the Hutu extremists
do some cross-border raids. The Tutsis just experienced this enormous genocide,
are not in the mood to put up with anything, and are very scared of this. So you
quickly end up with cross border raids to try to get control. You have the worst of
all situations, a combination of fear and hate.
So they begin coming across the border on the reprisal raids. And it leads to the
first war of Zaire in 1996. Rwanda brings in Kabila as its person. There were
eight nations that intervened with troops, plus the Rwandan troops, plus there are
twenty different rebel movements at any given time. It is amazing how many sub-
sub-subgroups there are, and many of the nation states are allied with the sub-sub-
subgroups and using them against national rivals.
This is the worst war since World War II. More people died, more people
raped, more starvation, more disease. It is a civil war; it's an ethnic war; indeed, it
is the first Pan-African war. As war is a continuation of diplomacy by other
means, this is simply a continuation of looting by other means. The allies turned
out to be every bit as rapacious as the people that are allegedly invading and that
the allies are supposedly defending against. The pros are felons.
Conservative economics has a theory of spontaneous organization that says
whenever an economic institution is needed, a profit opportunity will exist, and it
will spontaneously arise. Well, they certainly spontaneously arose in this context
because western corporations rushed to join in; they rushed to join in with a host of
different folks. Eight different nations were headquartered and had armies actually
in the field in different parts of the Congo.
Congo has its army in portions, plus there are these rival insurrections. All of
them are cutting deals with huge corporations that are willing to deal with these
entities. The looting just becomes astonishing, and you get the army as thief.
African borders do not make much sense in terms of ethnicities and the fear is once
you start changing the borders, where would you stop. Here is a novel solution: we
do not change the borders formally, we just occupy and we just loot. But we never
make a claim that says this land is ours. They do not hit the worst of the
inhibitions and they get so rapacious that the man they just installed actually turns
on them. And of course they decide they have to get rid of him, he is assassinated
and there is a second Congolese war in 1998.
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So my question out of all of this is so why are we all talking about diamonds?
Why make movies about diamonds?15 There is a whole series of these African
conflicts. None of them involving the diamonds primarily are remotely as large as
the Congolese wars. None of them are remotely as destructive. They are terrible,
but they do not come close to the scale. Congo has more deaths, more atrocities,
more looting. It is a war that threatened the entire continent's stability. It is a war
that actually threatened the international economy, because it turns out the Congo
has a unique source of many of the things we need in modern cell phones and other
communications, unlike all of the other countries that were in conflict.
There certainly was not a lack of knowledge. In fact, there are a couple of UN
reports that give you chapter and verse on how the Congo was looted and who was
doing the looting. There were many efforts at mediation. But there was absolutely
no effective international action against the mass theft of Congo's resources.
There was very little helpful action by business. Overwhelmingly you would have
to say that business rushed to the Department of Looting. And business follows
Congo because it is such a producer. The United Nations asked business to take
action against all the forms of looting, and they refused.
Now among all of these players, all of them look bad including the non-players
that stay on the side and simply ignore it, like the United States. Zimbabwe
especially looks bad and you can understand why Rwanda was so afraid. You can
understand why Uganda was upset, but Mugabe has used the theft from the Congo
to stave off bankruptcy. We keep having these headlines. Wait a minute, how did
Zimbabwe make this latest interest payment? They did it by stealing from Congo
and Zimbabwe, of course, has utterly refused to help or cooperate.
So again, why do we have all the attention now from DiCaprio and Blood
Diamond? There's nothing unique about diamonds; yes, they helped fund other
conflicts, but they did far less than these other much more valuable minerals in
many cases. It was not diamonds that were the principle reason things were
happening in Congo; rather it was other minerals that were far more important. So
why the focus on diamonds? I would suggest to you it is because we are dealing
with the world's most successful cartel and probably the world's best marketers as
well. Because diamonds should be one of the cheaper things you can imagine,
there are immense stocks of diamonds sitting in drawers. You all get a pittance for
a diamond that you try to sell because diamonds are not worth much at all, and the
only reason they are is because of this very effective cartel.
15. See, e.g., BLOOD DIAMOND (Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. 2006).
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Now what does a cartel have to do? A cartel restricts production and sale. So
who is threatened in this context? The people selling diamonds, right? Because if
you are an official seller they, companies like De Beers, come and cut you a deal.
They buy you out, and that puts you into the cartel. They did this famously with
Russia, for example, back when it was the Soviet Union. But you cannot do that
with hundreds of thousands of people along a very long river, and so De Beers
found this incredibly brilliant strategy. They could be on the side of the angels,
getting praised by Amnesty International and others; get the United Nations to
enforce their cartel by cracking down. I am not saying that is such a bad idea, but
you can see why if we cannot get this one to work, this Kimberley Process, 16 there
is nothing that is ever going to work. This is a unique situation where the private
enterprise has an enormously strong economic incentive to enforce these rules.
So do not use the phrase "legitimate sellers," because there are no legitimate
sellers. If you applied normal antitrust laws, they would all actually be in violation.
On their websites, you will find an ode to what diamonds do for Africans, and
Mandela is their greatest spokesperson in all of this.
16. See The Kimberley Process, supra note 2.
